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a call to resist illegitimate authority

VIETNAM AND
CAMBODIA

THE WASHINGTON
ELEVEN

LOU AND ERYL KUBICKA

ELLEN CANTAROW

The fallowing is excerpted from a report presented by
the Kubickas to the Board of Directors of the American
Friends Service Committee in January. The Kubickas
have recently returned from South East Asia, where
they lived for several years. The views expressed are, of
course, those of the authors and not necessarily of the
AFSC.

I can't remember when I first met Grace Paley. It was
in the mid-Sixties, at a meeting, perhaps, or at one or
another anti-war rally. Mutual friends brought us back
together over the years. I grew to know her at rallies, at
demonstrations, at meetings. She would greet me with a
hug, a kiss, a hearty slap on the back, and a "Hello,
Darling!" uttered in a girlish voice full of New York.
Which wasn't special with me: it's a way Grace has with
anyone with whom she feels a human bond.
It was later that I began reading her short stories,
masterpieces reminiscent of Isaac Babel, the Russian
master of the tough, funny, ironic, and lyrical short
story. There are only two slender volumes of Paley
stories - The Little Disturbances of Man (1973) and
Enormous Changes at the Last Minute (1974). That she
puts out as rarely as certain cacti produce flowers around one story a year - owes to her meticulousness as
an artist and to her fullness of life: "My politics," she
recently told a reporter from New York's Soho Weekly
News, "interfere with my writing and my writing interferes with both and both interfere with my walking
around the street like I like to do - so alright."
So all right. One story a year, and continued participation in the great social movements of our time is okay
by me. Grace has come to represent not only the world
of great writing but concern for the simply human,
which has sometimes seemed elusive in the Decade of
Disco. It was concern for the simply human that moved
Grace Paley and ten other members of the War Resisters League (WRL) last September to step out from
continued on page 2

At this point fast moving developments in the VietnamKampuchea war would seem to preclude sure predictions.
Yet most observers have already concluded that the Pol
Pot regime will never again be able to return to Phnom
Penh. Be that as it may, Pol Pot has vowed to fight a
guerilla war and thus it is conceivable that the fighting
and suffering might go on for a protracted period. World
opinion as well as' 'great power'' strategic considerations
may well play at least a minimal role in determining the
ultimate outcome of the present fighting, and these two
factors could conceivably become very significant. We
believe that it is important that we attempt to understand
the factors that have led to yet another full-scale, tragic
war on the Indochina peninsula, and of considerable
importance to consider positions and actions concerned
observers might take with respect to this war if it
continues - as we believe it will.
Our understanding is that the war is neither primarily a
border war, nor is it a conflict inevitable because of
centuries-old racial animosities between the Khmer and
Viet peoples. the conflict began between two communist
parties and is rooted mainly in ideological differences
concerning the nature of bilateral cooperation, international alignment, and the nature of revolutionary
foreign policy. However, to maintain that the conflict is
so rooted is not to deny that there are many additional
factors, some of which explain why the conflict has
escalated as it has. Just to mention two such nonideological factors: the understandable historical but
immediate fears of Vietnamese domination on the part of
r:<JrHinued on page 4
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dark-rimmed glasses one can't see the eyes, but as each
of the Eleven testifies and as the judge interposes
comments and pronounces sentences seriatim, one imagines the eyes are a nondescript brown or gray, good
covers for a zealous soul. Invited to speak, the defendants do so, one by one. Seen from behind, Karen
Malpede, the second of the Eleven to be judged, looks
very young and thin. "I sincerely believe it is possible to
live in a peaceful world," she begins. "We have the
responsibility of giving a forum to that idea. . . sometimes our actions are faltering because we are just
beginning." Judge Smith leans forward, glacially paternalistic. The glasses glitter: "You could have gotten a
permit. You should not have come here unlawfully, you
know. Do you understand what I'm saying?"
Others follow, their observations punctuated by the
judge's questions and the refrain, "Do you understand
what I'm saying?" Clearly the defendants understand.
They hold fast. "If I saw young children playing with a
carton of dynamite," says Gail Bederman, a twenty-sixyear-old actress from New York, "I'd have a moral
responsibility to stop them. When I see grown men
playing with forces that threaten to annihilate the
world, I'd be behaving irresponsibly if I didn't try to
stop them.''
"We chose the White House and Red Square so tlrat
people would pay more attention to what we were trying
to do," asserts Ralph DeGia, a sixty-four-year-old
WRL staff member. "In 1961 there was a San
Francisco-to-Moscow walk. We were asking the people
of the world to disarm. People said, "We can't trust the
Russians.' But in Russia people said, 'We can't trust the
Americans.' We're saying something to the people of
the world. I'd rather be with my children than be here
today, but I'm doing this to save my children, as well as
other people's."
There is much self-conscious drama in all this. In the
small vault of the courtroom, with Smith as a foil, it is
very effective. I look around and realize that the several
court officers have been drawn into the debate. They are
watching each defendant with expressions of some
interest. Smith is impassive but relaxes often into what
seems like jocularity. Really, he is playing with the
defendants, toying with them, cat and mouse.
The defendants come across in varying degrees of
political sophistication or naivete. Some are long-time
pacifists, others are relatively new to the movement. I
find myself liking them all very much. I like their
morality, the simplicity of their message, their plain
decency and mutual support. Grace Paley comes last,
kisses a small, white-haired veteran pacifist, Karl
Bissinger, who has just gotten three years' probation.
By now the audience is beginning to enjoy the presentations and a few people smile expectantly. Smith: "Miss
Paley, have you nothing to say?" Paley (matter-of-fact):
"Nothing." Smith (incredulous): "Nothing!?" Laughter ripples around the courtroom. Paley: "We were
trying to speak beyond the range of our own voices, and

their guided tour of the White House and onto the front
lawn, where they unfurled a banner: NO NUCLEAR
WEAPONS - NO NUCLEAR POWER - U.S.A. OR
U.S.S.R.
At the same moment seven other WRL members
staged a similar demonstration in Moscow's Red
Square. They were detained briefly and sent on their
way. The D.C. group, after an arrest and a thirty-hour
detention, were slapped with the heaviest possible
charge, ''unlawful entry,'' which carries a maximum
penalty of $100 fine and/or six month's imprisonment.
"It's as though," Grace told a Village Voice reporter
last December, "in the midst of the terrible noise of
impending war, someone dropped a feather and the
administration said, 'Did you hear that? Arrest those
guys!' "
Last week Judge Donald Smith, Nixon appointee to
the District of Columbia Superior Court, gave the
Eleven the stiffest sentence he could have imposed
without putting them in jail - $100 fine or ninety days
in jail; 180 days suspended sentence; and two to three
, years' probation, during which the Eleven are barred
from participation in any activism in Washington. All
Eleven have paid the fine, and it is likely - pending
group consensus - that they will appeal the decision.
I went to Washington intending to do a profile of
Grace Paley. But from the moment the courtroom
proceedings began I was convinced that Grace was only
part of a much larger picture: the story of nuclear
armaments that began in the Cold War against Russia
and is still unfolding in today's antinuclear movement.
Monday morning. It is impossible not to spot the crowd
in the very clean, very new caverns of the glistening
court building. About 300 have gathered on the second
floor by nine in the morning, a mix of young people and
Fifties and Sixties pacifists. The prevailing dress is
frayed corduroys, worn wool slacks, stocking caps,
aging ski parkas. It's a cheery, haimish, peacefully
browsing crowd. Into this scene, on a note peculiar for
its mingled ominousness and absurdity - a note that
will continue sounding all morning - a court officer
tells the crowd to line up in "orderly" fashion. His
voice is sharp with anxiety and high officiousness.
Several court officers move through the crowd, containing it like sheepdogs, streamlining it into a long queue to
the left and the right of the courtroom door.
Containment seems the order of the day. ''Eleven
more will have to leave!" comes yet another sharp order
in the same tone of faintly suppressed hysteria, once
some fifty people, including the Eleven and their families, are seat~d in the tiny, carpeted, soundproof courtroom. Its capacity: forty-eight, not counting the jury
box, where the defendants seat themselves at first.
The drama is like courtroom proceedings of the
Sixties: a morality play. The sides shape up, Grace Paley
becoming simply one of eleven dissidents against the
State. The judge, of course, is the State. Behind the
2

At the top of the escalator I begin talking with
another officer. Not a TPF member, he is in regular
blue uniform. He is young with light coffee-colored skin
and childish white teeth. He looks very boyish. "What's
this all about?" he asks. I explain. "Oh, they stepped
on the lawn?" he demands. "Yeah, they came armed
with leaflets. A dangerous bunch," I reply. He smiles.
"Listen," I hazard, "what do you think about this
nuclear stuff?" Another pause. "Well, I was lying in
bed the other night," comes the .answer, "and I was
thinking about my little boy. Like, I wondered if he
would live to be twenty-one." "How old is your little
boy?" I manage to ask. "One year old," he says, and
then: "Did you ever have that bad dream?" I think of
1958, when I saw my first anti-nuclear film. It was
partly about Hiroshima, and it broke forever the hold
of the first Cold War on my childhood. I think of a
report, published February 6 in the Boston Globe:
fallout from atomic weapons tests in Nevada twenty-six
years ago may be the cause of cancers just now discovered in adults who were children then. I think of
what is now considered "safe" radiation doses from
natural and manmade (e.g., nuclear power plant)
sources: any is unsafe, say some. The others talk about
rads and millirems and it would take a whole article
merely to explain the vocabulary and inter-scientific
squabbles. All such thoughts are the work of a second.
"Yes, I have had that dream," I reply. "I think
everyone has."
It is in the simply human that the movement against
the Cold War had its roots. And clearly, the movement
lives on. Just days before the sentencing, an evening
benefit reading in Boston by Karen Lindsey, Marge
Piercy, Denise Levertov, and Grace Paley drew a crowd
of almost 900 people to the Arlington Street Church. At
a similar evening in New York February 7, around 750
braved a heavy snowfall to listen to Toni Morrison,
E.L. Doctorow, and others. Several hundred attended a
rally called to send off three busloads of New Yorkers to
Washington. And after the sentencing, at a rally in front
of the White House, tactical police arrested twenty-two
people who had sat down in the White House driveway
in unlawful, effective dissent against nukes.
What happens next? I certainly don't know. But it
comforts me to remember, the SALT talks looming in
the back of my mind, that only twenty years ago smaller
demonstrations than the ones taking place since the
Eleven's arrest last September launched the Sixties, the
definitive break with the first Cold War, the Age of
Rock, the movement against the war in Vietnam. And it
was the movement, here and in Indochina, that broke
the war. It is not impossible that it could happen again.

we succeeded. We stepped on the lawn to be heard ....
we wanted to do the simplest, quietest, gentlest, most
forceful thing. The event was made disruptive by the
police, who flew in and got hysterical .... In a world so
full of bombs being piled up, so full of money being
spent on war, it was necessary. Our own city, New
York, has been bombed three times over by the Defense
budget. Anyone who comes to New York or Washington says, "Why, there's been a war here.' And there
has." What troubles Smith, he says, is that Grace Paley
has been sentenced on previous occasions for similar
offenses. "I'm getting older, I'll have to stop soon,"
she says, the Yiddish intonations strong. Laughter from
some of the onlookers. "Do you mean," banters Smith,
"you're thinking of retiring?" He's toying with her
again as he's toyed with all the defendants. "The White
House Forces," Smith addresses Grace squarely for the
first time, it seems, "didn't know who you were. One of
the things they have to look out for is a terrorist
attack." The diminutive Paley stands, reflective while
some people in the audience look incredulous: the
fantasy is preposterous. "There could have been,"
Smith repeats, "other people in the White House who
could stage a terrorist attack. So what you did was really
very disruptive.'' I am transported back to elementary
school, down to the basement where we sat, backs
against the wall, knees up, heads down, waiting for the
glass to splinter inward, waiting for the Russians to
come. The old Cold War hysteria, impenetrable by any
reason since it's mass paranoia, a mass pathology, is
seeping up around us like swamp gas. It is the same
feeling pervasive in the hall as the court officers imposed
"order" on the crowd earlier.
"I've received a lot of letters," continues Smith to
Paley, "probably more about you than about any of the
others. The thread of those letters is a misunderstanding
of why you are before the court ... they seemed to think
the court was something repressive, a tool of the
Establishment to crush dissent." The onlookers exchange glances heavy with irony. I balk at any knee-jerk
reaction. The court isn't actually crushing all dissent, it
is simply practicing what Herbert Marcuse calls "repressive tolerance." Dissent is okay as long as you practice it
according to law. Picket lawfully in front of the White
House. Block no driveways. Had the Eleven done all of
that they wouldn't have been arrested: the press would
have ignored them. Smith is against all effective dissent,
and what dissent is worth its salt but an effective
dissent?
Outside the courtroom the crowd waits, and as we
come out they cheer. At least ten, perhaps a dozen,
helmeted and visored tactical police advance like giant
crabs, nightsticks held rigidly at horizontal position,
crotch level. "Just move along, that's it, move along."
A few people try talking with the TPF but the TPF are
schooled against human interaction with the crowds
they control. They advance, herding the straggling mass
through the gleaming hall and down the escalator.

This article is reprinted from The Real Paper, Boston
alternative weekly.
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region?" How do the neighboring nations feel?
2. What way out of a protracted conflict would result in
the least deaths and suffering and yet result in a social
order that the Kampuchean people would support
and that would respect the fundamental rights of all
persons?
3. If the Pol Pot regime is able to fight a protracted
guerilla war is there any serious possibility of resolving this war by compromise through negotiations?

(continued from pap l)

many Kampuchean people and, on the other side of the
ledger, incessant border skirmishes (often initiated by a
fearfully belligerent Kampuchea) which added significantly to Vietnam's already critical food situation and
reconstruction problems. Additionally, what is at issue
and at stake is the social order and domestic policies of
Kampuchea.

Most concerned observers are caught in a conflict of
disapprovals, between disapproval of the Kampuchean
regime's highly regimented collectivist social order sanctioned to some considerable extent by violence and fear,
and disapproval of Vietnam's invasion and apparent
political-military success in driving the Pol Pot regime
from Phnom Penh and replacing it with a Kampuchean
leadership more willing to cooperate with Vietnam both
bilaterally and, presumably, with regard to foreign
policy.
The Carter administration which has during the last
year taken the lead in condemning human rights abuses
in Democratic Kampuchea, calling Kampuchea the
''world's worst human rights offender,'' is now similarly
caught in a dilemma between its condemnation of that
regime and pursuing the longstanding geopolitical strategy that regards the Moscow-Havana-Hanoi alignment
as the greatest longterm danger to the free world and
U.S. interests. Thus we find Richard Holbrook stating
that "We do not wish to suggest any form of support for
it" [The Kampuchean regime of Pol Pot - ed.], but at
the same time explaining that the U.S. views a Cambodian state as a legitimate part of the independent
system of states in Asia and that "a generation ahead we
would hope that there would be a Cambodian state.'' 1
So in spite of recently avowed U.S. neutrality in the
Vietnam-Kampuchea war the United States clearly does
not want to see Vietnam control or dominate Cambodia
and has attempted to exert pressure against Vietnam by
taking the war "into account in deciding the past of
normalization of relations with Vietnam ... " 2 which
clearly means further delaying normalization. The U.S.
failure to normalize with Vietnam has both pushed
Vietnam closer to the Soviet Union and rendered U.S.
influence on the leadership of Vietnam negligible. That
may be an unwanted result, but several observers have
pointed out that another possibility is that some U.S.
"national security" strategists have deliberately sought
to push Vietnam closer to the Soviet Union, both to
descredit Vietnam in the eyes of third world countries,
and so that a China fearing encirclement would move
more readily toward the U.S.
There are at least three questions of particular importance that should be considered as we attempt to
formulate our thinking about recent events in the
Vietnam-Kampuchea war.
1. Will the new Kampuchea United Front for National
Salvation (KUFNS) actually turn out to be dominated by Vietnam, and if so what will be the domestic implications and the regional implications.
Regarding regional implications, would a VietnamKampuchea "militant solidarity" then become an
objectionable threat to the' 'peace and stability of the

Before we attempt to make some suggestions about
how these questions might be answered, perhaps it would
be well to review what can be understood with some
degree of probability regarding the issues and origins of
this war.
The ideological differences which we believe to be at
the root of this conflict are stated differently by the two
sides, but it is nevertheless not impossible to discern the
basic issues. Democratic Kampuchea accuses Vietnam of
wishing to make Kampuchea "a satellite," of wishing to
control or "swallow up" Kampuchea under the concept
of an ''Indochina Federation,'' or under the concept of a
"special relation." They say that Vietnam "is an integral
part of the bloc of the big expansionist,'' meaning the
Soviet Union, and allege that Vietnam has an identical
ideology with the Soviet Union and that Vietnam is a
member of the same economic, political, and military
alliance.
·
Democratic Kampuchea portrays itself as a people and
revolutionary army which has made "many sacrifices to
liberate themselves, secure the independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity of their country and · protect
their honor and dignity" and a nation which resolutely
refused to become "the slaves of the Vietnamese or any
major Power. " 3 The leaders appeal to the international
community to constrain Vietnam and support their
"independence struggle" on the basis that Vietnamese
expansionism would inevitably have harmful consequences all over the world. They have warned that
Vietnam and "its master" will not fail to expand into all
South East Asia if they take Kampuchea. Significantly
Norodom Sihanouk has very recently repeated this
warning, even as he disassociated himself completely
with the domestic policies of the Pol Pot regime.
Vietnam's presentation of what is at issue is considerably more sophisticated and rather more oblique than
that of Kampuchea. The Vietnamese note that in 1974
Pol Pol pledged that "In all sincerity and from the
bottom of my heart, I can assure you that in all circumstances, I will remain faithful to the line of great
solidarity and of fraternal and revolutionary friendship
between Kampuchea and Vietnam, whatever the difficulties and adversities we may encounter. " 4 The Vietnamese blame "a third party" - China - for much of the
deterioration in the Khmer/Viet relationship. They
accuse Kampuchea of carrying out a "proxy antiVietnamese war ... " and have stated that the "only
obstacle to a peaceful settlement between the two countries is the policy of a great Power in Asia that has long
4

had ambitions of expansion and hegemony in SouthEast Asia, ... "s Additionally, the Vietnamese have
accused the Kampuchean authorities of fomenting strife
with Vietnam in order to repress and liquidate as
''pro-Vietnamese,'' legitimate Kampuchean opponents
of Pol Pot's "criminal" domestic policies, and in
general to control the population in the face of widespread unhappiness with those harsh policies. The Pol
Pot government has not commented, but must have
seen the estimated 8,000 Khmer cadres who returned to
Kampuchea in 1970, after years of training in North
Vietnam, as a Vietnamese "fifth column." Presumably,
it was primarily these people who were the target of the
Pol Pot-directed 1977 purge and program of liquidation
which is thought to have eliminated most of them.
All of the above might seem at first glance to indicate
that there is very little common understanding of the
conflict on the part of the leadership of the belligerent
nations. However, a close reading of passages such as
the following ones reveals that, though they word it
quite differently, the Vietnamese and Kampucheans
have a very similar understanding of the real issues.
In a section of the Vietnam Courier's Kampuchea
Dossier entitled "The Kampuchean Authorities' Allegation about a So-called "Vietnam-dominated Indochina
Federation with Only One Party, One State, and One
People Is Completely Groundless" we find this revealing statement:

Defend the
People Victory

Support the
Khmer Rouge 8 the PRG
1975

"The policy of fanning national hatred and enmity
between Kampuchea and Vietnam and sabotaging the
friendship between the two peoples is part of their
policy of creating border conflicts with neighboring
countries, applying a closed-door foreign policy, enhancing narrow nationalism and rejecting international cooperation (such as co-operation on the
Mekong River) ... ~ [emphasis ours - ed.]

have considered Vietnam's tendency to subordinate
Kampuchean interests to those of Vietnam. Also, they
have long been critical of all aspects of Soviet-style
communism including Soviet internationalism which
they likely believe masks a Soviet will to dominate. The
KCP came to believe that international socialist integration with a relatively advanced Vietnam with roughly six
times the population of Kampuchea and favorably
inclined toward Soviet policies was not in Kampuchean
interests, especially with respect to Kampuchean sovereignty or "honor and dignity." In fact we believe that it
can be shown that the draconian style of Khmer socialism was, in part, formulated by the KCP precisely in
order to be able to resist being drawn into a relationship
with Vietnam in which Kampuchea would ultimately
lose its independence and sovereignty. While the Pol
Pot regime's fears were not unfounded it seems obvious
that the regime so overdid its resistance to Vietnam that
it became highly provocative and vulnerable.
As the earlier quoted excerpt of Pol Pot's 1974 letter
to Le Due Tho shows, wartime cooperation with Vietnam led to a considerable degree of solidarity. But as a
line in a later letter hints - "The relations between our
two Parties, based on mutual respect and absolute noninterference in each other's internal affairs ... " 8 the
Kampuchean leadership nevertheless intended to pursue
a policy of radical independence which involved a very
different domestic policy from that of Vietnam's more
traditional (and Soviet) style of communism. While
Vietnam did not at all approve of Kampuchea's domestic policy, considering it infantile and destined to be-

And elsewhere in the same volume:
"The authorities in Phnom Penh pride themselves on
their political line, which they describe as being
"based on independence, sovereignty and the principle of relying on our own strength." [But - ed.] ...
Genuine patriotism necessarily implies internationalism. Reverting to outmoded chauvinism and leaving
the path of militant solidarity wi~h nations fighting
against imperialism - as the Kampuchea rulers are
now doing - can only lead to the orbit of the
imperialists and reactionaries ... " 1
"Leaving the path of militant solidarity with nations
fighting against imperialism" is the same charge that
Vietnam makes of China.
We personally have formulated the following somewhat peculative theory about the development of the
Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict - a theory which is not
terribly flattering to either side.
The French educated side of the Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP), the side which has been dominant
since 1963 at least, ha long been critical of what they
5

smear socialism if not downright inhuman, it seems
likely that Vietnam would have been willing to let it be if
only Kampuchea would accede to a few rectifications,
accept a certain level of bilateral development cooperation, and join Vietnam in a common regional strategy
based on the concept of socialist internationalist responsibility and ''militant solidarity.''
It seems to us likely (the following is speculative,
though it offers a cogent overall explanation for what
has occurred) that Vietnam would have pressed Kampuchea quite hard in negotiations, and sometimes in
1976 the Kampuchean leaders began to feel threatened
and to react strongly. In order to further pressure Pol
Pot & company Vietnam may have also decided to
ignore the agreements both the NLF and the DRY made
with Kampuchea in 1967 which, in return for Kampuchea's renouncement of any claim to large areas that
had been taken from Kampuchea in the French delineation of the border, would have given Kampuchea full
authority to delineate the border in a few small areas
where the line was unclear. To do this the Vietnamese
simply needed to resist withdrawing from ambiguous
areas and to call for further negotiations, which would
have sounded very reasonable to all except the Kampucheans, who had given up all claim to vast areas
(Kampuchea Krom) in southern Vietnam precisely in
order to avoid the negotiability of further minor
disputes.

tion of an anti-Pol Pot Front. Another even more
important source of anti-Pol Pot personnel were the
survivors of the paranoic anti-Vietnamese purges within
the KCP during the spring of 1977.
In September (1978) Nayan Chanda wrote that
"Cambodia's survival as a counterweight to Vietnam
has since 1956 been the cornerstone to Peking's policy
toward Indochina." 10 In our view China's role in the
development of this conflict is not at all insignificant.
(And there is no evidence that the Soviets played a
similar role.) Though the Chinese may not have wholly
approved of Pol Pot's domestic policy (the basis of the
relationship from the Kampuchean side was that China
would not attempt to interfere with domestic policy)
China undoubtedly discouraged Kampuchean cooperation with Vietnam, encouraged the proclivity of Kampuchean leaders to take a tough anti-Vietnam stance,
and made it clear to the Pol Pot leadership that China
would support Kampuchea's stand on the border question. When that truculent stand led to border atrocities
and military conflict with Vietnam, China must have
further assured Kampuchea of support. Personally we
know that just before the visit of the late Chou En-Lai's
wife - Teng Ying-chao - to Phnom Penh in midJanuary 1978 the Vietnamese and many other observers,
including U.S. intelligence analysts, thought that China
was reconsidering its support of Phnom Penh's antiVietnam truculence. At that time the Vietnamese told us
privately that "We will not be split from China" and
appeared to be seriously hoping and hopeful that China
would back off from full support for Kampuchea and
continued militarization of the conflict. But after Teng
Ying-chao's January 18th press conference in Phnom
Penh the Vietnamese apparently found their hopes
dashed and returned to their former posture vis-a-vis
both Kampuchea and China.

"This policy was designed to put a definitive end to
what were perceived as Vietnam's (and Thailand's)
'traditional' salami tactics of making a series of
ostensibly reasonable demands for minor readjustments that ultimately add up to major territorial
losses. " 9
The Kampucheans may also have been dismayed or
infuriated by Vietnamese claims regarding the delineation of the offshore boundaries between the two
countries.
Then perhaps both in order to demonstrate their firm
resolve on the question of the nature of the relation
between Kampuchea and Vietnam and to demonstrate
their resolve to hold Vietnam to its 1967 border agreements, the Kampucheans likely ordered their troops
(perhaps ·using some euphemistic language which the
troops might interpret as they saw fit) to resolve the
border question in disputed areas. The military actions
and tragic large scale atrocities that ensued not only
deeply angered the Vietnamese but ultimately set the
stage for a limited military action which made it possible
for great numbers of Kampucheans to take refuge in
Vietnam. Though many persons fled on their own
Nayan Chanda told us that some Kampuchean refugees
with whom he had spoken had reported leaving Kampuchea by Vietnamese military trucks. The large Khmer
refugee population in Vietnam, and the population in
areas of Kampuchea which came to be controlled militarily be Vietnam for a time, then became the basis on
which Vietnam could support and encourage the forma-

The United States has not remained completely uninvolved in the Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict. During
his recent trip to China Zbigniew Brzezinski told
Chinese leaders that "we recognize and share China's
resolve to resist the efforts of any nation which seeks to
establish global or regional hegemony,'''' and there can
be little doubt but that 'regional hegemony' was aimed
at Vietnam. In fact we can say that there has existed a
measure of "de facto U.S. support, via China, for
communist Kampuchea against communist Vietnam," ' 2
though the United States does not wish to see the
conflict escalate into a major Sino-Soviet confrontation. Avowed U.S. neutrality in the conflict notwithstanding, the recent U.S. condemnation of Vietnam's
invasion has as its basis not the principle of military
intervention in another nation (we are more than well
prepared to do that in many situations) but rather
regional and global anti-Soviet alliance strategic considerations.
Returning to the questions posed earlier, we would
like to suggest the following. Firstly, the new Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation will
shortly need to demonstrate that it is patriotic, has
6

(But we should not confuse the security of the status
quo in the region with the good of the people. In our
view it is just as much of a mistake to support a
militarily maintained status quo perpetuating serious
social and economic inequities - as the U.S. does now
- as it would be to support a socialist military interference.)
We think the AFSC should strongly urge that (1.) the
United States desist from any encouragement of further
support for a protracted guerilla struggle against the
new government of Kampuchea; (2.) that the United
States should recognize the new government of Kampuchea if it stabilizes and normalizes relations with
Vietnam; (3.) that the United States should offer immediate humanitarian assistance to Kampuchea and food
aid to Vietnam. Only such a full turn-about from the
present U.S. policy of animosity towards Vietnam, a
policy which has caused a great deal of suffering, and
exacerbated rather than ameliorated the problems of the
region, will bring hope that the people of Vietnam,
Kampuchea and the region may be spared further
suffering.
(10 January 1979)

Kampuchean interests at heart, and is not simply a
puppet of Vietnam in spite of the fact that these people
surely share much of the Vietnamese outlook and have
had full Vietnamese military support. After the Pol Pot
era the new domestic policy will likely win for the new
government of Kampuchea a significant degree of
domestic support and even gratitude, and in our view
this will offset or ameliorate in considerable measure
anti-Vietnam animosities and apprehensions, providing
that the Vietnam Army conducts itself as it has in the
past and withdraws from Kampuchea at an early date.
If the Pol Pot regime proves to have the means to
survive the present offensive in a form that would
enable it to conduct the protracted guerilla struggle that
has been threatened - and we believe it will - it would
seem to us that this will never amount to more than a
spoiling action that would cost the Kampuchean people
much additional suffering. But in such event we think
that the AFSC should do everything in our power to
encourage an early rather than late compromise arounc'
the figure of Norodom Sihanouk, who, in spite of
recent statements, might well be acceptable to Vietnamese and to the KUFNS if threatened with a protracted struggle, and who would almost surely be
acceptable to the Chinese who must see that Pol Pot will
never again take Phnom Penh. Also Sihanouk likely
remains highly acceptable to the people of Kampuchea.
Even if there never should be a compromise built
around Sihanouk, it would seem to us that there is not
yet any evidence that fears of a continuing direct
Vietnamese expansion are realistic. Laos and Kampuchea border Vietnam and non-hostile governments in
those two countries are seen by Vietnam as essential to
the well-being of Vietnam, in much the same way that
the United States sees it as essential that Canada and
Mexico remain non-hostile. Cooperation between the
three Indochinese countries was in fact essential to the
victory of the Vietnamese revolution as those in Laos
and Kampuchea. Beyond that, the Vietnamese policy of
"militant solidarity" would probably be a threat to
neighboring nations only if the internal situation in
those countries deteriorates sharply as the result of
domestic factors, though we must temper this judgment
with the caution that long term behavior on the part of
nations has not proved to be very predictable.
In the recent past and at present the non-Communist
nations in the region have tended to regard Vietnam as
the most significant threat. But if the Chinese are
successful in supporting a protracted resistance to the
Vietnamese in Kampuchea, regional fears of Chinese
power may come to the fore. Thus it may be that
ASEAN nations would feel most secure if a ChinaVietnam balance is struck.
It seems clear that if Sihanouk were to have a
significant share of power in a compromise Kampuchean government the ASEAN nations, the People's
Republic of China, Australia and the United States
would feel much more comfortable regarding the long
term security of the status quo in the region, since direct
Vietnamese influence would then be pretty much limited
to Kampuchea and Laos only.

NOTES
1. Washington Post (WP), p. A-18, 5 December 1978.
2. Ibid., p. A-18.
3. UN General Assembly Provisional Verbatim Record
of the Thirty-fourth Meeting, 13 October 1978,
(A/33/PV .34, p. 47).
4. Kampuchea Dossier, p. 10, quoting excerpt of letter
dated 4 March 1974 from Pol Pot to Le Due Tho.
5. UN, op. cit., p. 21.
6. Kampuchea Dossier, p. 117.
7. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
8. Ibid., p. 9.
9. From a letter to the journalist by Steve Heder of
Cornell University, as published in The Revolution in
Kampuchea, a collection of papers edited by the
Swedish-Kampuchean Friendship Association & the
Norwegian-Kampuchean Friendship Association.
10. Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 September 1979, p.
11.
11. Southeast Asia Chronicle, Issue no. 64, SeptemberOctober 1978, p. 27.
12. Ibid., p. 26.

A packet reprinting 30 articles on the conflicts between
Vietnam, China, and Kampuchea, including the one
printed above, is available for $1.50 from the Ad Hoc
Viet Nam Support Committee, P.O. Box 129, Dorchester, MA 02122.
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GRANTS
UNION W.A.G.E. (PO Box 40904, San francisco, CA
94140).

FIGHT BACK GI PROJECT (Ingrimstr. 28, 2900
Heidelberg, West Germany).

The Union Women's Alliance to Gain Equality (WAGE)
was founded in 1971 by San Francisco Bay Area women
who felt that the existing feminist organizations were not
meeting the needs of working-class women, including
housewives, the unemployed, retired, and those on
welfare. Their emphasis has been on helping women
organize into unions and gain power in their unions.
Their bi-monthly newspaper ($3.50/year) is one of the
most useful and readable on the left. Union WAGE is
organized by chapters, and has been expanding into a
national organization. Resist's grant was to support their
February convention, which brought members from all
over the country to determine the future direction of the
national organization.

Fight Back GI has organized among American soldiers
stationed in Germany since the Vietnam War era. Resist
has supported them several times in the past. This grant
was to support printing and distributing information
about the situation in Iran, at a time when there was the
prospect that US troops stationed in Germany might be
part of an American military intervention in Iran.

PORTLAND TENANTS UNION (834 S.E. Ash, 2nd
floor, Portland, OR 97214).
The Portland Tenants Union has been aiding tenants for
three years. Their work includes educational work,
advocating more low income housing from the city, and
holding community workshops on tenants' rights. They
are now focusing their organizing on Housing Authority
buildings, the black community, and other poor neighborhoods in Portland. The Union itself is composed of
locals of tenants activists, as well as individual or
household tenant union members. They also maintain a
telephone hotline for tenant problems, and have published a handbook of tenants' rights. Resist's grant is to
support publication of their newspaper, The Tenants

PUERTO RICO SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE (Box
319, Cooper Station, New York, NY, 10003).
The Puerto Rico Solidarity Committee supports the
independence movements in Puerto Rico, calling for
complete US withdrawal from that island. They have
chapters in NY, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, San
Francisco, Los Angeles, and other cities, and publish
Puerto Rico Libre!, one of the best sources of news on
the liberation struggle. At their June, 1978 national
meeting they decided to focus their work on three areas:
raising the status of Puerto Rico at the United Nations;
organizing support for the fishermen of the island of
Vieques, who object to the use of their island for
bombing and target practice by the Navy; and supporting
the Puerto Rico trade union movement. Resist's grant
will support a circulation campaign to increase the
readership of Puerto Rico Libre!

Voice.

ABORTION ACTION COALITION (PO Box 2727,
Boston, MA 02208).

The Abortion Action Coalition is one of several organizations which has been working toward the formation of
a national network to coordinate struggles around reproductive rights issues. Resist's grant to the AAC is to cover
the costs of printing and mailing information on reproductive rights issues, and on the activities of organizations concerned with these issues. The efforts of the AAC
and other organizations led to the formation in late
February of the Reproductive Rights National Network.
The RRNN plans a national petition campaign to defeat
the Hyde Amendment (which has cut off federal funds
for most medicaid abortions for the past two years); a
combined counter demonstration and conference at the
national "Right to Life" convention in Cincinnati on
June 23; and a fall mobilization to be planned with other
coalitions and organizations, focusing on the defeat of
the Hyde Amendment. Hyde Amendment petitions may
be obtained from the AAC; to contact the Reproductive
Rights National Network, write to 3244 N. Clark St.,
Chicago, IL 60657.

COMMITTEE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF
BERLIN'S LABOR HISTORY (34 Main St., Cascade,
Gorham, NH 03581 ).
Berlin is known as the "paper city", and is the major
industrial center of northern New Hampshire. It has also
been a center of political activism, including a vigorous
Socialist Party just prior to World War I, and what was
probably the largest Farmer-Labor party of any US city,
dominating city government from 1936 to 1943 . The
Committee for the Preservation of Berlin's Labor History has prepared several exhibits of photographic and
other reminders of this past, and has prepared a short
booklet to accompany a slide show program and poster
display geared to schools. ·Resist's grant is for general
support of this activity.
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